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The year 2009 began with a monumental historical event in the US. On January
20th, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44th President of the United States, becoming
the first black man to ever hold the office. Three months later the first cases of H1N1
would begin to appear in the US, marking the beginning of the Swine Flu Pandemic.
Summer came and with it the chapter 11 bankruptcy of American automotive giant
General Motors in June. The 6th film in the Harry Potter franchise would release
worldwide in July, and pop musician Kesha would round out the season in August with
the release of her hit single “Tik Tok”. The long-running television programs “NCIS LA”
and “Modern Family” would premiere on US television in September, and October 22 nd
would mark the release of Microsoft’s newest operating system “Windows 7” to the
public. Four days later and approximately 4,500 miles away from the everyday
happenings of the US, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) would commence the trial of Radovan Karadžić on the charges of violating
customs of war, crimes against humanity and genocide.1 The ICTY, as a branch of the
United Nations, prosecuted Karadžić for his role in the Bosnian War from 1992 to 1995,
formally accusing him of organizing and executing the ethnic cleansing and genocide of
thousands of Bosnian men and women. Five years after the commencement of his trial,
Karadžić would be found guilty of four counts of violation of the laws or customs of war,
five counts of crimes against humanity, and one count of genocide.2

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Case Information Sheet:
Radovan Karadžić” (The Hague, 2016).
2 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Trial Judgement Summary for
Radovan Karadžić” (The Hague, 2016).
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Nineteen years before the trial that would ultimately conclude with his lifelong
imprisonment, Radovan Karadžić was just beginning to establish himself as a force in the
political landscape of Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Abandoning his former life as a
physician, Karadžić was elected first ever president of the Serbian Democratic Party
(SDS), a radical Serb-nationalist political party, in Bosnia on July 12, 1990.3 Over the
next two years, with the backing and direction of Serb-nationalist powerhouses like
Slobodan Milošević, Karadžić set up the Bosnian SDS to be a major political force in
Bosnia. By March of 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina had voted by referendum to declare
independence from Yugoslavia, causing Karadžić and the SDS to spring into action.
Karadžić led Bosnian Serb nationalists into armed conflict with the Bosnian government
in April as the Republika Srpska (RS), a new political entity constituted by the former
SDS. The RS sought to establish an ethnically Serbian sovereign state within Bosnia and
Herzegovina and laid claim to large parts of the country. The Army of the Republika
Srpska (VRS), under direction of Karadžić and with resources supplied by Milošević and
the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), was formed shortly after the declaration of Bosnia’s
independence and began the Siege of Sarajevo in April of 1992, constituting the start of
the Bosnian War.
Before the signing of the Dayton Accord in December of 1995, which ended the
war, the VRS, at the direction of its Supreme Commander Radovan Karadžić, controlled

Robert Donia, Radovan Karadžić: Architect of the Bosnian Genocide (Cambridge University Press,
2014), 81.
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much of the territory outside central Bosnia and Herzegovina and executed the mass
extermination and expulsion from those lands of Bosnians. 4 While estimates of total
casualties from the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina aren’t definite, scholars estimate that
they number at least over one hundred thousand and that over half were Bosnian.5
Furthermore, we know that violence perpetrated by the VRS was not limited to the killing
of only Bosnian men and boys. VRS forces carried out a campaign of brutality
throughout their controlled territories that consisted of forced expulsion of Bosnians and
Bosnian-Croats from their communities, mass torture and murder of Bosnian and
Bosnian-Croat civilians, widespread and systematic rape of Bosnian and Bosnian-Croat
women, and destruction of religious buildings.6 These events have come to be known as
the Bosnian Genocide, a term that describes the specific practices of ethnic cleansing of
Bosnians and Bosnian Croats by the VRS in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992-1995.
The most well-known event from this period is the Srebrenica massacre, a tragedy
widely referred to as the most heinous act of mass murder in Europe since WWII. Over
the span of two weeks during July 1995, VRS forces led by Ratko Mladić overcame the

4

See Figure 1

E. Tabeau and J. Bijak, as cited in Robert M. Hayden, “Mass Killings and Images of Genocide in
Bosnia, 1941-5 and 1992-5,” in The Historiography of Genocide, ed. Dan Stone (London, United
Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008), 487.
6 Mihailo Crnobrnja, Yugoslav Drama, 2nd ed. (Montreal, CANADA: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1996), 186; Duško Sekulić, Garth Massey, and Randy Hodson, “Ethnic Intolerance and
Ethnic Conflict in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 29, no. 5 (September 1,
2006): 797–827; Todd A. Salzman, “Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious,
Cultural, and Ethical Responses to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia,” Human Rights
Quarterly 20, no. 2 (1998): 348–78.
5

3

defending UN forces and carried out the murder of over 8000 Bosnian men and boys and
the abduction and serial rape of over 20,000 Bosnian women and girls before burying the
dead in mass graves. The emotional impact of familiarity with this event’s details is
captured by the statement of one ICTY Judge:
“After Srebrenica fell to besieging Serbian forces in July 1995, a truly terrible massacre of
the Muslim population appears to have taken place. The evidence tendered by the
Prosecutor describes scenes of unimaginable savagery: thousands of men executed and
buried in mass graves, hundreds of men buried alive, men and women mutilated and
slaughtered, children killed before their mothers' eyes, a grandfather forced to eat the
liver of his own grandson. These are truly scenes from hell, written on the darkest pages
of human history.” 7

These events offer the starkest of juxtapositions, only occurring a mere thirteen years
before the election of America’s first black President, to the popular perception of a
modernized and civilized world. One’s likely reaction to first learning about such an
event might be to ask “why”. Why would anyone do something like this? Why did
Bosnian Serbs feel the need to carry out such unmitigated violence against their own
neighbors? How did such an attitude towards killing become accepted as the norm? Why
did no one stop this from happening?
Such questions have become the domain of Genocide studies since its inception
after the events of the second world war. As a result, scholars have started providing
answers to these questions for the sake of preventing genocide. However, the enormous
swell of genocide scholarship over the past 30 years has failed in reducing the occurrence

Note 5 in Hennie Strydom, “The Srebrenica Genocide and the Responsibility of States and
International Organizations,” Journal of South African Law / Tydskrif Vir Die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg
2008, no. 3 (January 2008): 499.
7
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of genocide across the world. Instead, we have witnessed a consistent presence of
genocide in the world since the advent of the concept in the 1950s in places like Rwanda
and Yugoslavia most famously. The persistence of genocide as a social action in modern
societies has allowed modern scholars to try and build models from historical data for
predicting the occurrence of genocide. Barbara Harff’s political risk model, one notable
example of the multiple statistical models produced by genocide studies, identifies six
variables that affect the probability of genocide occurring in a nation-state.8 By
evaluating countries on these six variables: political upheaval, prior genocides, ideology
of ruling elites, regime type, ethnic character of ruling elites and trade openness, the
model projects the probability of a genocide or politicide occurring within that country.
Harff’s model is a rigorously thorough piece of social science which takes into account a
myriad of potentially relevant variables and operates with mathematical precision to offer
conclusions about the potentiality of genocide. What I find most interesting about Harff’s
model is not its accuracy, correctly differentiating “with 74% accuracy the 35 serious
civil conflicts since 1955 that led to episodes of genocide” from those that didn’t.9 Rather
it is the instances which her model is unable to correctly differentiate, namely the
Bosnian Genocide.
Harff notes that “all episodes of genocide… of the last half-century have been
carried out by elites or rival authorities in the context of internal war and regime

Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and
Political Mass Murder since 1955,” The American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 57–73.
9 Harff, 70.
8
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instability.”10 While she is correct as it pertains to past instances, burgeoning genocides
like those which we seek to prevent are not exclusive to these contexts. Furthermore, it is
becoming clear that political contexts characterized by government hegemony are worth
keeping a close eye on. Recent work has been undertaken to expose the actions of the
Chinese government against the Uyghur minority ethnic group in China’s northwestern
Xinjiang region. The regime of Xi Jinping, who is so steeped in power that his departure
from it is seeming more and more unlikely,11 has orchestrated the mass internment,
forced “re-education”, restrictions on religious practice, widespread surveillance and
“disappearances”.12 Estimates so far count the total number of Uyghurs forcibly interned
by these policies to be over one million since early 2017. The Uyghur genocide, as it is
being labeled with more and more frequency, is not the result of some seismic political
upheaval or the instability of the dominant regime like the cases analyzed by Harff’s
model. Further, the Uyghur genocide is truly a modern genocide in that it persists despite
the development of a culture which largely identifies such acts as evil. Such
characteristics make the Uyghur genocide a problematic case for past etiologies of
genocide and therefore require the revision of our accounts of how genocide happens.
This is the aim of my project.

Harff, 70.
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, “China Has No Plan for Who Will Succeed Xi Jinping – Leaving the
Nation and the World in Uncertainty,” The Conversation, February 1, 2022.
12 U.S. Department of Labor, “Against Their Will: The Situation in Xinjiang,” 2021; Joanne Smith
Finley, “Why Scholars and Activists Increasingly Fear a Uyghur Genocide in Xinjiang,” Journal of
Genocide Research 23, no. 3 (July 3, 2021): 348–70.
10
11
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Rather than seeking to give a causal explanation of genocide and ethnic cleansing,
I ask the more pointed question “are there patterns present at the societal level that signal
the potentiality of genocide in a given cultural context?” Through examination of two
socially and temporally distinct instances of genocide, the Bosnian genocide and the
Uyghur genocide, I argue that there exist certain patterns which precede historical
instances of genocide and that these antecedent phenomena contribute to the potential for
genocide in those societies. I identify three broad trends that contribute to the potential of
genocide: the cultivation of ethnic nationalism among an ethnic majority with significant
political power, the employment of mythologizing rhetoric by political elites in
constructing relevant identities and using the cultural memory of past instances of
extreme violence (real or manufactured) to substantiate the risk posed by a certain group
to the whole.
This theory is not meant to negate any particular past etiology of genocide; rather
it is an account of the social dimension to genocide which may supplement past
etiologies. Genocide is a social action tautologically, as genocides don’t occur devoid of
social groups, thus any account of how it becomes possible must include an
understanding of how societies are primed to commit such atrocities. This understanding,
which I will construct in the following work, has to be applicable across unique instances
of the phenomena if it is to be taken as a fundamental aspect of the phenomena. The two
instances selected for my comparison, Bosnia and Xinjiang, satisfy this uniqueness
condition through the stark contrasts between their cultural contexts, state structures,
historical contexts and any number of other relevant differences. Furthermore, these two
7

instances represent what I will refer to as “modern genocides” in that the societies which
propagate them are proximal to the lessons learned from the Holocaust. Terms like
“modern” are notoriously difficult to nail down an exact demarcation for, but I generally
mean that modern genocides are those which occur despite the global reaction to
genocides as a social phenomenon prompted first by the Holocaust. In addition to
uniqueness, my case selection is particularly advantageous to the aim of determining the
nature of genocide as the Uyghur genocide represents an ongoing event within a
politically stable global superpower. Realist etiologies of genocide that ascribe the lion’s
share of causal power to metrics like the presence of political upheaval are unable to
account for the kind of social priming that I argue contributes to how genocide is enabled
across two distinct cases.
The difficulty of depoliticizing scholarship on Yugoslavia’s collapse has been
widely noted13 and certain arguments have been used by Serb apologists in attempts to
justify the events of the Bosnian war or shift blame to the victims. I would like to note a
few things about the aims of my work here. The topic of the Bosnian Genocide is both
extremely complex and emotionally charged, such that I feel it necessary to address the
potential implications of an endeavor such as mine. It is not my purpose, and I actively
reject such pursuits, to provide justification for the actions of any who actively
participated in the genocide and ethnic cleansing of Bosnians from 1992-1995. The field

Katrine Haug Hilde, “Debating the End of Yugoslavia in Post-Milošević Serbia,” in Debating the
End of Yugoslavia, ed. Florian Bieber, Armina Galijas, and Rory Archer (Farnham, United
Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), 113.
13
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of comparative genocide studies also suffers from certain deficiencies that ought be
addressed before moving further. As can be seen in the discourse over the correct
labeling of the Uyghur genocide, the field of comparative genocide studies lacks
consensus on foundational concepts like what genocide even is and what is the right way
to compare instances of genocide.14 This constitutes a methodological problem for the
field that has yet to be resolved and will not be the subject of my theorizing. Such debates
are necessary for the healthy development of the field but answering these meta level
challenges is not a precondition for theorizing about how historical events come to occur,
which is the content of this work. My goal in the following is to give a more complete
explanation of how such an unimaginable tragedy could come to occur by highlighting
the complex nature of its causes. With that clarification in mind, I will begin my
examination of the Bosnian genocide with the story of Yugoslavia’s collapse.

A crash course towards “destiny”; Serbia and the collapse of Yugoslavia
For many there can be no “good answer” to questions of why or how, as the
irrational nature of the violence precludes it from rational explanation. However, much
scholarship has been undertaken in light of the events of the 1990s in the former
Yugoslavia, and many potential explanations have been supplied as a result. Some point
to the political leadership of the former Yugoslavia, some point to the global economy’s
role in weakening Yugoslavia, others argue that the South Slavs have always been

Anton Weiss-Wendt, “Problems in Comparative Genocide Scholarship,” in The Historiography of
Genocide, ed. Dan Stone (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008), 44.
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predisposed to “primeval” ethnic violence.15 Mihailo Crnobrnja finds that, while being
“variously labelled a ‘civil,’ ‘tribal,’ ‘ethnic,’ and ‘religious’ war,” the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina was all of those things.16 In answering the question “how did the Bosnian
genocide happen,” there are really three questions that need answers: why was there
fighting at all, why was it done along ethnic lines, and why did the fighting result in the
particularly heinous forms of violence it did? Drawing upon arguments from various
areas of post-Yugoslav scholarship, I argue that the ethnic cleansing committed by
Serbian militaries in the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990s is best
understood as being caused by the creation and manipulation of a Serbian Manifest
Destiny centered on the establishment of a Greater Serbia in response to the public
perception of a national crisis. The economic and political situation of Yugoslavia by the
1980s produced national instability, which set the table for internal conflict between the
republics. This instability was acted on by Serbian nationalists like Slobodan Milošević,
Ratko Mladić, and Radovan Karadžić. These figures constructed a sense of crisis within
their political base through a specific use of ethnonationalist rhetoric made effective by
the history and memory of the Serbian ethnic group. What resulted was a transhistorical
Serb identity that became weaponized by its cultivators for the sake of establishing an
ethnically pure Greater Serbia at all costs. It is this pursuit which motivated and guided
the genocidal actions of the VRS in Srebrenica and elsewhere during the Bosnian war.

Milovan Djilas as cited in Sabrina P. Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the
Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 3.
16 Crnobrnja, Yugoslav Drama, 178.
15
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Yugoslavia’s national instability during the 1980s provided the foundation for
nationalist politicians like Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, future perpetrators
of genocide, to ascend to power. This instability, to which the impetus of Yugoslavia’s
collapse can be credited, was the result of two main events: the development of state
structures from WWII to the late 1970s, and the power vacuum caused by the death of
President Tito. The nation of Yugoslavia arose conceptually from the sentiment of south
Slavic peoples following the Balkan wars between the Ottoman empire, Serbia, Croatia
and others in 1913. As Kate Hudson puts it, they realized “that only a unified south Slav
state could be viable in the face of competing regional economic and strategic
interests.”17 The project of unifying the south Slav ethnic groups under one nation was
tempered through the first world war, in which the kingdom of Serbia was victorious over
Austro-Hungarian forces in liberating the Balkans. The interwar period saw the first
iteration of a south Slav state, known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The
monarchic state organization of this first version of Yugoslavia was destined for failure,
as the increasingly popular ideologies of fascism and communism in interwar Europe
began to take hold among the population of the Yugoslav states. At the onset of WWII,
the ethnonationalist fascist Ustaše took hold of Croatian politics and sided with the axis
powers, declaring independence from the kingdom of Yugoslavia and trying to establish
a fascist Croatian ethnostate.

Kate Hudson, “The ‘First’ Yugoslavia: Origins and Problems,” in Breaking the South Slav Dream,
The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (Pluto Press, 2003), 8.
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The only defense for Yugoslavia from the ensuing invasion by German, Italian
and Croatian forces during WWII was the loyalist militias of the communist Yugoslav
Partisans, led by Marshall Josip Broz Tito, and the Serb nationalist Chetniks. While the
latter devolved from cooperative defense of Yugoslavia alongside the Partisans to
fighting with them over the direction of the war, the Partisans and their leader Tito were
extremely effective in combatting the axis aggressors. Their victory over fascism in
Yugoslavia established the Partisans as the dominant political organization coming out of
WWII, as they won an overwhelming majority of political representation in the first
election following the conclusion of the war.18 With a new guiding political ideology and
leadership, the newly named Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was set on
rebuilding what was lost through years of war and uniting of its people’s historically
disparate interests.
The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, led by Marshal Josip Broz Tito, was now in
control of the newly formed government of Yugoslavia and, in light of the massive
damage suffered by the country during WWII, quickly mobilized to provide support for
its people.19 Strict nationalization of multiple industries, respected amongst other
European communist regimes as being especially faithful to Stalin’s communism, began
shortly after the ratification of a new constitution in 1946. Yugoslavia also heavily

Crnobrnja, Yugoslav Drama, 68; Singleton and Carter as cited in Hudson, “The ‘First’
Yugoslavia,” 15.
19 Žerjavić as cited in Bogdan Denitch, Limits and Possibilities: The Crisis of Yugoslav Socialism and
State Socialist Systems (Minneapolis, United States: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 22.
18
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benefitted from the import of essential materials from the United Nations in the years
immediately following the conclusion of WWII.20
As a communist nation, Yugoslavia was closely related with the Cominform and
Stalin's Soviet Union immediately postwar. Tito and his communist Partisans had
delivered the south Slav republics of Yugoslavia from destruction during WWII and
united them under the control of his party. However, as a result of Tito rejecting the
Soviet influence on Yugoslav policy, Yugoslavia was cast out of the Cominform and
Stalin’s inner circle of European communists in 1948. This came to be known as the TitoStalin split, an event that signals the beginning of Tito’s Yugoslavia in earnest. As a
rejection of Soviet influence Tito purged his communist party of pro Stalin members in
1948 and cemented his role as sole leader of the party, and therefor of Yugoslavia. He
would begin the process of decentralizing certain parts of political leadership shortly after
his split from Stalin, establishing local governments in the form of People’s Committees,
workers councils in industrial and agricultural sectors, and trade unions throughout the
country in the 1950s.
Tito and his party, the renamed League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), also
began playing the middle with Yugoslavia’s geopolitical position between the United
States’ and the USSR in their growing ideological war. When Tito first came to power
the Soviet Union was responsible for many of the imported goods and aid that held up the

Singleton and Carter as cited in Kate Hudson, “The Tito Years,” in Breaking the South Slav
Dream, The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (Pluto Press, 2003), 42.
20
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country, but with their expulsion from the Cominform the withdrawal of Soviet aid
followed. The United States was willing to pick up the slack and provide economic
support for Yugoslavia so that it could stand as an example of eastern European socialism
free from the support and influence of Stalin.21 Yugoslavia’s relationship with the US and
the USSR from this point on constituted a fragile geopolitical balancing act between the
influences of eastern European communism and western liberal capitalism. Yugoslavia
began receiving massive amounts of US foreign aid in the mid to late 1950s which
propped up the federal budget as their export earnings began to be outpaced by import
costs. The trade deficit would become a major contributor to the economic crisis faced by
Yugoslavia in the 1970s and 1980s.
In response to the rising deficit and lack of domestic production, Tito emphasized
gradual decentralization of key managerial offices in the 1950s and 1960s. This
represented a massive departure from the traditional Stalinist form of communist
governing, and therefore played into the role Yugoslavia held in the US-Soviet Cold War.
The expansion of self-management in the late 1950s was coupled with a new vision for
socialism in Yugoslavia, as the state began steering economic policy away from strict
central planning and more towards a unique form of market socialism.22 However,
decentralization of the economy necessarily meant increasing the power and agency of
the Yugoslav republics. Postwar Yugoslavia was different from the Yugoslavia of the

21
22

Hudson, 46–48.
Denitch, Limits and Possibilities, 63.
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1960s in that the six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia all were brought to heel under the leadership of the
Communist party and the power of the federal government. This achieved political unity
by making the individual republics subordinate to the federal government and therefore
the nation. However, as the government began allowing more and more economic
autonomy to the republics, it allowed the sense of unity cultivated by the strictness of
Tito’s regime to erode.
One of the most significant successes of Tito in his time as President of the
former Yugoslavia was his ability to stave off division amongst the constitutive republics.
As president, he would frequently and brutally put down ideological opposition to the
Communist project in Yugoslavia.23 Communism was the banner under which all
“Yugoslavs” were to rally, and the interests of the State were necessarily paramount. Tito
had changed the focus of political discourse among the South Slavs from the interests of
the individual ethnic groups to the interests of achieving a communist state. This began to
change in the 1960s as the economic system of Yugoslavia began to decentralize. As
mounting economic pressures and reliance on western aid pushed Tito increasingly to
liberalize the Yugoslav economy and create “self-managing structures within the
economy,” the unifying power of centralization waned.24 The shift towards a market
economy coincided with a reforming of Yugoslavia’s constitution in 1967 and 1971 that

Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of
Milosevic, Fourth Edition (Boulder, United States: Taylor & Francis Group, 2002), 5.
24 Hudson, “The Tito Years,” 51.
23
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delegated even more autonomy to the republics. The unifying power of communism had
all but given way to federalism, Singleton notes that this fact “simply whetted the
appetite of the more extreme nationalists for further devolution.” 25
By the 1970s, Yugoslavia had evolved from a strongly centralized communist
pseudo-autocracy to a socialist market economy with a leader looking for a solution to
the national deficit. In the following decade, three events would set the stage for the
chaos of the late 1980s: the 1974 constitution of Yugoslavia, the economic crisis of the
1970s, and the death of Tito in 1980. Tito and the LCY were set on decentralization as a
means of integrating the economies of Yugoslavia with western economies and to cut
back the power of majorities in government.26 This republican sentiment was enshrined
in the 1974 constitution of Yugoslavia, which established not just the six republics as
States with equal rights and privileges, but also the two autonomous regions in Serbia,
Vojvodina and Kosovo. In addition to various other policies focused on limiting the
power of any one ethnic group in government, this new Constitution put Serbia, the
largest of all the South Slav groups in Yugoslavia, on equal ground politically with
Vojvodina and Kosovo which Serbia had long treated as being rightfully theirs.27 This
restructuring of state powers challenged previous notions about the position of Serbia
within Yugoslavia, opening the door for the ethnonationalist politics of the 1980s.

Singleton as cited in Hudson, 52.
Branimir Anzulovic, “The Dilemmas of Modern Serbian National Identity,” in Heavenly Serbia,
From Myth to Genocide (NYU Press, 1999), 95–96.
27 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 5–6; Dejan Jović, Yugoslavia: A State That Withered Away (Purdue University
Press, 2009), 97–100.
25
26
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The Yugoslav economy was suffering from a dysfunctional tax system, an
increasing reliance on foreign aid and a newly developing oil crisis in the mid to late
1970s.28 In addition to struggles at the federal level, disparity between Yugoslavia’s
constitutive republics began to grow in the 1970s as well. While republics like Slovenia
and Croatia were doing relatively well under the increasingly liberalized policies of Tito,
others like Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were struggling to keep
their heads above water.29 The liberalization that benefitted Slovenia and Croatia failed to
transform the nation’s economy into a full-fledged western liberal economy, which
hampered Yugoslavia’s ability to respond to the oil crisis of 1974.30 The increase in oil
prices made it more difficult to fund industry in the republics without already thriving
markets, further depressing economic output for the country and increasing its debt. The
deteriorating geopolitical position of the Soviet Union in the late 1970s also led the
United States to decrease its aid to Yugoslavia, a vital stream of resources still incredibly
important for sustaining the country’s population. In conjunction with a massively
inefficient economic system and mountains of foreign debt, this decrease in aid meant
oncoming poverty and struggle for the people of Yugoslavia. The arrival of the 1980s
brought both material and cultural pain to Yugoslavia, as the nation suffered the loss of
its Father.

Denitch, Limits and Possibilities, 54; Kate Hudson, “Economic Assault: The 1980s and the US
Drive for a Free Market,” in Breaking the South Slav Dream, The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (Pluto
Press, 2003), 59.
29 See Figure 2
28
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Crnobrnja, Yugoslav Drama, 76.
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Serbian Dreams and Bosnian Nightmares; creating a genocidal “Serb”
The death of Tito in 1980 and of vice president Kardelj only a few years earlier, a
political figure who bridged the gap between Serbian politics and Tito during debates
about the constitution of 1974, left the newly federalized socialist republic of Yugoslavia
without strong political authority at the top. This also left the nation without Tito’s strong
drive to repress nationalist politics in favor of “Brotherhood and Unity.” Much of the
unified “Yugoslav” identity was cultivated despite the politics of the individual republics.
Whether it be the favorable view of liberalization from Slovenian and Croatian politicians
or the desire for a strong central state held by Serbian politicians,31 nationalist interests
were ever-present in the politics of Yugoslavia but were held in check by Tito’s
unwavering commitment to his own goals. Without such a force, the 1980s were witness
to the unfettered rise of nationalist politics amidst economic crisis, a surefire recipe for
trouble.
If it was not the domineering President Tito that kept Yugoslavia together from
1945 to 1980, then surely it was the primacy of his party, the LCY, over all other political
parties. The LCY dominated politics in Yugoslavia to such a degree that it came to be
described as “central non-state source of power.”32 In the years following the death of
their leader, the role of the LCY as thought leader in Yugoslav politics was no more, as

31
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Anzulovic, “The Dilemmas of Modern Serbian National Identity,” 97.
Crnobrnja, Yugoslav Drama, 70.
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political power was dispersed amongst the republics with the constitution of 1974. Each
of the republics developed its own dominant political parties, most often communist
parties, and along with them different views on the path forward for both Yugoslavia and
their republic. The debate at the national level was generally on whether continued
decentralization or an attempt at recentralization would prove to be the solution to the
economic crisis of 1983. Political action fell to a standstill as no solution could be agreed
upon at the national level, leaving the economic situation to fester and with it disdain for
the political establishment.33 The situation in Yugoslavia was getting so dire by the mid1980s that rationing of resources like gasoline, electricity and foodstuffs like sugar and
flour was put into place to stave off starvation in the population.34 It was becoming clear
to the political elite that a drastic change needed to be undertaken lest the nation fall
completely into abject poverty.
By the 1980s, the Yugoslav union was plagued by mass poverty, unemployment,
economic gridlock and the search for a new Tito, a new savior. The Croatian people
found theirs in the form of Franjo Tuđman and the Bosnians theirs in Alija Izetbegović,
both nationalist secessionists who saw the future of their States best served by
independence from Yugoslavia. The Serbian people found their salvation in the form of a
banker named Slobodan Milošević, the son of a schoolteacher and a theologian. Each of
these three represented the result of the economic and political trends in Yugoslavia up to
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1980, but only one actively fashioned public opinion into a weapon for use against the
other republics. The sense of crisis for Serbs was compounded by the increasingly
common occurrence of anti-Serb protests taking place in Kosovo and Vojvodina.
Conflicts between different political positions were becoming increasingly
uncompromising and predicated on the interests of individual republics. Serbian interests
seemed to be under attack from multiple fronts in 1986: civil unrest in the autonomous
regions, Slovenian and Croatian drives for further republican autonomy which limited
Serbian power,35 and a political party that was unable to change the status quo. Ivan
Stambolic, former president of the League of Communists of Serbia, was elected to the
Presidency of Serbia during this time. He left his vacated leadership role in the
communist party to his longtime friend and supporter Milošević, a decision met with
scrutiny by many in the party.36
Unknown to Stambolic at the time, Milošević was about to change the tone of
Serbian politics forever. He immediately began clashing not just with liberal members of
the Serb communist party but with Stambolic himself. Milošević was a hardline centralist
communist who was focused on amassing as much political power as he could toward the
end of reestablishing a strong central government. This may sound similar to the pursuits
of Tito during the 1940s but there is one stark difference in ideologies between Milošević
and his predecessor. Milošević came to power after the political inefficacy of the first
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half of the 1980s by fanning the flames of Serbian nationalism. Beyond playing to
nationalist interests, Milošević called upon Serbian history to create a narrative that
demanded the supremacy of Serbs over their fellow Yugoslavs. Milošević envisioned the
salvation of Yugoslavia from its current crisis as the salvation of Serbia. It was the
destiny of Serbs to rule Yugoslavia and thrive as a result. This was the end to which
Milošević strove in his political career, and to that end he would spread the word to his
people.
The process of priming the Serbian population towards genocide began in 1987
with Milošević appearing publicly to support protests against Albanian persecution of
Serbs in Kosovo. Louis Sell, post-Yugoslav scholar and expert on Milošević’s political
career, notes that this experience was hugely influential on the molding of Milošević’s
political strategy as it was in this setting where he realized the possibility of ruling by the
power of the masses.37 He quickly understood that Serbs in this time were extremely
receptive to the rhetoric of a particular Serbian mythos and began to structure his public
statements to reflect this fact. This political strategy leaned heavily upon a memorandum
written by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) in 1986 which framed the
history of Yugoslavia as a history of Serbian oppression and subjugation. A controversial
piece of scholarship even during its own time, the memorandum originally was leaked to
Serbian tabloids which published reviews labeling it reactionary and harmful. Despite
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this, the SANU memorandum supplied the public with the language necessary to describe
actions taken by the LCY, Tito and other Yugoslav politicians as violence against Serbs.
Central to the arguments made by the memorandum, and later by Milošević, is the
Kosovo myth, consisting of the story of the battle of Kosovo Polje and the expulsion of
Serbs from Kosovo in the 1600s.
The idea of Serbian primacy that underlies the SANU memorandum and
Milošević’s rhetoric runs far back into the history of the Serbian ethnic group. Possessing
both deep historical roots in the region, but also a strong, almost inseparable, tie to the
Eastern Orthodox Christian faith, the story of Serbia is actually the story of Yugoslavia in
many respects. The Serbian ethnic group traces its heritage back to the Byzantine empire
and the spread of Christianity to the Slavic peoples. One foundational characteristic of
Serbian identity is adherence to the Orthodox Christian faith, a reality during the time of
Yugoslavia and still in the present day.38 The Serbian Orthodox Church has been a major
power in the history of Serbia from its time as part of the Ottoman Empire through the
time of Milošević, pushing for Serbian interests in many contexts.39 Much of the Serbian
tradition employed in Milošević’s rhetoric is built up from religious myths. These myths
tell a story of Serbia as a divine kingdom that has sacrificed much throughout history for
the sake of its religion. The idea of Serbia as a divine kingdom stems from myths like the
epic poem “Battle of Kosovo,” also known as the Kosovo Polje myth, wherein the
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saintlike figure Prince Lazar of Serbia sacrifices the lives of the entire Serbian army
along with his own in a battle against Muslim Turks in Kosovo for the sake of God’s
Heavenly Kingdom.40 This myth describes the battle of Kosovo Polje, a 14th century
historical event wherein the Ottoman Turks defeated Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović and the
Serb army in battle and brought Moravian Serbia under Ottoman rule.
Serb myths like this became one of the main ways Milošević and other Serbian
nationalists communicated the need for Serbs to establish themselves at the top of
Yugoslav politics, a practice widely engaged in by Serbian intelligentsia and a narrative
which became popular among the Serb masses in the late 1980s. These myths served to
create a narrative that places “the Serbs on par with the Jews with regard to their historic
victimization” and paint Kosovo Albanians as a danger to the safety of the Serbian
people.41 Kosovo represents the “Serbian Jerusalem”, and the Kosovo Polje myth situates
Serbs within the Eastern Orthodox religion as God’s chosen people.42 This approach of
appealing to a historical and religious Serbian identity to vilify groups in the present day
works in two ways, one being, as Christina Morus highlights, in its ability to address a
“collective subject” and create a savior figure in Milošević by invoking a “transhistorical
Serbian ‘people’.” 43 By appealing both to the religious predilections of the Serbian
population and Serbian mythos, the rhetoric of Milošević explained current issues facing
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the Serbian people not in rational terms but instead as “the culmination of an ancient
historical trajectory” and subsequently lowered the psychological bar of rationality for
acceptable solutions to those problems. 44 To put this idea in context, adherents to
Milošević’s politics were more willing to accept any decision which he gave them to
address a particular issue because that issue was the result of a mythological, historical
destiny and therefore could best be addressed by an equally mythological savior figure, a
role which Milošević came to fashion himself after. The real solvency of his policies
became deemphasized by the mythological character of the issues he spoke about to the
public. The sense of transhistorical-ness refers to how “Serbians” of the past are made
equivalent to current members of the Serbian ethnic group so as to impart the emotional
impact of past Serbs being victimized onto real Serbs in Yugoslavia. A transhistorical
Serb people also contains a teleological pull towards some true direction or destiny of the
group. By construing the history of Serbians as a narrative both linear and contiguous,
Milošević was able to convey a sense of purpose inherent in being Serbian that ought to
be realized by Serbians of the present day, namely the domination of their oppressors.
Milošević’s rhetoric also succeeded in priming the Serbian people against
outgroup members by appealing to the non-mythological history of his audience. While
appeal to myth was central, large parts of the SANU memorandum were also dedicated to
historical atrocities suffered by Serbs at the hands of various groups. I have already
discussed the events of WWII in Yugoslavia and the propensity of Tito to silence
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nationalist opposition to his regime, but I have not yet acknowledged the numerous
atrocities suffered specifically by Serbs who were silenced by the Tito regime. First is the
mass ethnic cleansing of Serbs by the Croatian fascist group Ustaše during WWII.
Hundreds of thousands of Serbs were slaughtered by the Ustaše so brutally that even
some German Nazis were put off by their methods.45 This fact was quickly suppressed
postwar by the Communist party and was never a point of amelioration between Serbs
and Croats. Serbs also bore the brunt of Tito’s violent suppression of nationalists, most
famously in the example of the Goli Otok concentration camp where Tito sent thousands
of, mostly Serbs, political prisoners to labor and die. This camp was in operation from the
Tito-Stalin split until the late 1980s when it was finally dismantled, years after the death
of its creator. Widespread understanding of this shared history of oppression amongst the
Serbs of the 1980s anchored the mythological retelling of the Serbian destiny within
reality, lending credence to Milošević’s rhetoric about the threat posed by Kosovo
Albanians, and later by Croats and Bosnians, to the safety and wellbeing of the Serbian
People.
In the few years following his Kosovo trip in 1987, Milošević deposed his mentor
Stanbolic from the Presidency of Serbia by installing supporters in any political office he
could as well as purging the Communist party of Serbia of his detractors. Milosevic had
conditioned the Serbian people to believe that he would lead them to achieve their destiny
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of reclaiming holy lands from the murderous invaders who presently occupy what is
rightfully theirs. This fact was enshrined by the million Serb rally held at the site of the
Battle of Kosovo Polje in Kosovo on its 600th anniversary. At this rally Milošević spoke
of modern Serbia as being the same Serbia from 600 years prior, and that the Serbian
state was about to embark on its crusade to restore lands lost through the years of Serb
oppression. The Serbian people were on the precipice of regaining their righteous glory,
of realizing the dream of Greater Serbia through the domination of their enemies.46
Milošević extended this dream to the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were already
well on their way down the path towards radicalization.47
By 1992 ethic nationalism was the flavor of politics across Yugoslavia,
motivating Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to cut their economic losses
and secede from the Yugoslav federation. Bosnia’s secession from Yugoslavia prompted
Bosnian Serbs, led by Karadžić and working alongside Milošević and the JNA, to launch
their own project to establish an independent state in pursuit of achieving a “Greater
Serbia,” thus beginning the Bosnian war. Bosnia and Herzegovina had historically been a
more ethnically pluralist republic amongst the other, far more ethnically homogenous,
Yugoslav republics. Comparable amounts of both Bosnians and Serbs called Bosnia and
Herzegovina home through the history of Yugoslavia, with Croats making up a smaller
proportion of around a tenth the population. Further, these three south Slav groups often
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lived side by side throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. So, when Radovan Karadžić
began issuing orders to Colonel-General Mladić and VRS militias to expel and cleanse
the Serb territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina of non-Serbs in 1992, what followed was
neighbors slaughtering neighbors and friends subjugating friends.
Still left unanswered is why a war started to establish an independent Serbian
state in Bosnia necessitated ethnic cleansing, sexual violence, and targeted attacks on
religious figures, sites, and practices such that we now refer to it as a genocide. I posit
one social determinant and one enabling force for the genocidal nature of the war in
Bosnia: the conception of Greater Serbia as ethnically pure determined the character of
the war, and dehumanization through the creation of the “other” further enabled VRS
combatants to withstand the emotional toll of carrying out this level of atrocity. The
phenomenon of otherization, a process aided by the religious dimension of the conflict,
was employed by VRS troops to make the acts of ethnic cleansing doable.
If the war in Bosnia fought by the VRS is understood as being for the sake of
establishing a Greater Serbia, then to explain the call for ethnic cleansing of Bosnians we
must understand the nature of the Greater Serbia dream. This dream sprang from the
same appeals to the Kosovo myth and the history of the Serbs that allowed Milošević to
unite and mobilize the Serb people against the other Yugoslav republics. 48 That is to say
that the conception of Greater Serbia necessitated the ethnic purity of its population, for
only Serbs are the chosen people of God. Milošević tried to downplay accusations of his
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movement being towards this end, but continually referred to it through the use of
collective language in his addresses to the Serbian people.49 The practice of establishing
ethnically pure states in the region had also been witnessed by the Serbian people during
WWII when the Ustaše enacted such policies against Serbs, Jews and others in Croatia.
This pursuit as necessitating ethnic purity explains why the VRS would sanction the
expulsion of Bosnians from their lands, but what is to be said about the extremely brutal
manner in which the VRS carried out the murder of Bosnians? One study carried out by
Duško Sekulić, Garth Massey and Randy Hodson in 2007 about the wars in Yugoslavia
suggests that the ultra-violent nature of the killing was not only the result of ethnic
hatreds but also a consequence of the events of the war itself. They argue that the natural
result of fighting a war against another group is increasing intolerance, especially so in
this case where political figures used media depictions of the conflict to intensify the
conflict.50
As the conflict during the 1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina was undoubtedly
religious in some respect, the act of killing was given religious context by the
manipulation of the Kosovo myth and Serbian identity. The dream of Greater Serbia
contextualized the war in Bosnia as Serbians slaying and wreaking vengeance on their
ancestral enemies (Bosnians being ethnic Muslims), thus taking away from the reality of
the war as a brutalization of one group of Yugoslavs by their neighbors. Bosnians were
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subject to the force of “otherization,” or the process of psychologically diminishing the
personhood of some individual by defining them as the other. This hints also at the role
of the collective memory of the Serbian people in the brutality of the fighting. Doris Gödl
argues that the repression of atrocities suffered by Serbians throughout their history aided
Milošević in shaping the cultural identity of “the Serb” as a victim of history. The
collective memory of Serbians as a historically victimized group at the hands of
Croatians and Bosnians was substantiated in Serb nationalist rhetoric, like that of the
SANU memorandum, by referencing the historical instances of anti-Serb violence
perpetrated by Croats and Bosnians discussed above. The especially brutal brand of
murder practiced by VRS militias was thus reframed as retributive, as getting back at the
those who abused them and forced them into silence afterwards. The effect was twofold:
VRS combatants had a way to justify to themselves the inhumane slaughter of their onetime countrymen, and Serb nationalist leaders had a way to tie all Serbs into their
messaging and mission.51 To members of the Republika Srpska, the Bosnians still living
in VRS controlled territory were no longer fellow Yugoslavs the way they once were, or
even fellow humans who just so happen to follow another faith.
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The prime conditions for Genocide; Xi Jinping’s unifying dream
Thinking about how perpetrators of genocide understand their victims, and
therefore the consequences of their actions, requires thinking about how those
understandings are constructed. In the case of Yugoslavia, political elites like Milošević
propagated ethno-nationalist politics within Serbia through carefully considered rhetoric
that redefined what being Serbian, and conversely what being non-Serbian, meant. Along
this rhetorical track, Serbians are God’s people who need to unite against outside
aggressions from Muslim Bosnians and Albanians who have killed and taken from Serbs
since ancient times. This kind of narrative building primes a particular audience to
consider the moral weight of individuals in such a manner that enables them to rationalize
the genocide of groups outside the narrative’s moral focus. The three trends outlined at
the outset of this work: cultivation of ethnic nationalism among an ethnic majority with
significant political power, use of mythologizing rhetoric by political elites in
constructing relevant identities, and evocation of extreme violence (actual or
manufactured) in the cultural memory for means of justification, constitute the narrative
building process which I argue primes social groups to commit genocide and are all
present in the case of the Bosnian Genocide. However, presence in one case does not
substantiate my argument that these trends are etiologically relevant to any modern
genocide. By applying the priming narrative framework to the contemporary case of the
Uyghur genocide, I will show that priming narratives are foundational to the
manufacturing of any genocide in modern contexts.

30

First, a word on terminology. As prominent scholar of the history of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) Gardner Bovingdon notes, “the very name of the region is a
bone of contention.”52 Xinjiang is the name given by the government of the Peoples
Republic of China, a fact which Bovingdon also notes that many natives of the region
detest. Terms such as Eastern Turkistan and Uyghurstan have been posed as replacements
for the title of the region, preferred by native Uyghurs due to the inherent
acknowledgement of the region’s historical and ethnic character. On the point of
determining proper terminology for discussing the Northwestern region of China, I will
defer again to Bovingdon who explicates that using the term “Xinjiang” is done “without
intending either to ratify the Chinese use of that toponym or to challenge the use of
Eastern Turkestan or Uyghurstan by Uyghurs.”53 My use of the term “Xinjiang” within
this work is purely instrumental to my purpose of communicating a sense to the reader
and not an implicit endorsement of the term itself.
Let me begin by reiterating the present conditions of the case to be examined
through the priming narratives framework of constructing genocides. The treatment of
Uyghur Muslims in the northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of
China has only recently come under the scrutiny of the international community after
investigations done by government organizations and Adrian Zenz, foremost scholar on
PRC policies targeting the Uyghur ethnic group, began to expose the full extent of the
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damage being done. While the suppression of this information by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) makes determining exact values impossible from without, this
investigative work has determined the existence of a vast network of “re-education”
internment camps wherein over a million Uyghur Chinese citizens, as well as a small
number of other Turkic minorities, are detained.54 Detainees are carefully catalogued
through biometric and video surveillance technologies, housed in gender-segregated
dormitories, subjected to ‘thought transformation’ programs, separated from their family
members and funneled into work programs that relocate massive amounts of Uyghurs and
other Turkic minorities to factories across Xinjiang and force them into low skill factory
jobs.55 These realities alone constitute grounds for international condemnation of the
Chinese political leadership for rampant civil and human rights abuses but as the policies
which underlie these programs are allowed to continue, so too does the escalation of
atrocities suffered by Uyghurs in China. New analysis of government documents paired
with firsthand accounts has established the existence of mass sterilization and
reproductive control programs targeting Uyghur women and the reproduction of the
Uyghur ethnic group.56
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The results of this focused sterilization campaign have already been borne out in
the data when looking at birth rates between minority counties and Han counties.57
Uyghur populations are being actively culled from Xinjiang by Chinese government
policies implemented over the last decade, and as time goes on, Uyghur voices are
becoming increasingly silenced by said policies. Not just biological reproduction, but
cultural reproduction in Uyghur communities too is being systematically eliminated
through outright bans on religious practices of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. 58 This, accompanied
by the separation of Uyghur family units previously discussed, severely hampers the
ability of Uyghurs to engage with their culture as well as impart their culture onto new
generations of Uyghurs.
Uyghurs are a Muslim Turkic ethnic group that have existed in the region now
known as Xinjiang for hundreds of years. Their story as a part of China has no clear-cut
beginning, unless you subscribe to the CCP narrative that “Xinjiang has since ancient
times been an inseparable part of China,”59 but two dates are most often supplied in
historical literature on the Xinjiang region’s development into a Chinese province. In
1759, Manchu imperial forces succeeded in their long-fought war against the rebellious
Dzungar khanate over control of the region. The Qianlong Emperor of the Manchu Qing
Dynasty would subsequently order the extermination of the Dzungar men and
enslavement of women and children, as they were guilty of having “turned their back on
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civilization.”60 Though, the history of the Uyghur people and their ancestral homeland of
the Tarim Basin has long been suppressed and manipulated by State produced and
sanctioned historical narratives even before the establishment of the XUAR in 1955.
The integration of the Xinjiang region into the domain of Chinese civil law
happened gradually over the period of time between its military conquest and its
codification as a PRC territory in 1955. Core to the difficulties experienced by Chinese
statesmen seeking to incorporate the region into the wider Chinese state was deciding
how Muslim ethnic groups like the Uyghurs were to be considered within society. For
decades, ethnic differences among Chinese social groups were emphasized through
policies of separation like bans on inter-ethnic marriage and literal wall-building to
separate majority Han areas from majority Turkic ones in the 1950s and 1960s.61
However, as David Tobin notes, these policies began shifting along with how Chinese
political officials considered the value of Xinjiang as a region. He notes that while “from
the outset, Xinjiang’s incorporation into China was a geopolitical military project viewed
through the prism of security for inner China,” that changed with the overthrow of the
Manchu Qing state and ascension to political power of the Guomindang (GMD) in the
early 20th century.62 This change in political leadership brought with it a
recharacterization of Xinjiang from being an ethnically divided strategic asset of the state
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in defending from potential western aggressors to “a relatively safe frontier” for Han
immigration and settlement among the native Turkic peoples. 63 The CCP carried on the
change in Sino-ethnic policy in their pursuit to extinguish artifacts of the past Imperial
Chinese society. Ethnic discrimination in China historically has been characterized by
Han chauvinism and primacy at nearly all levels of political power. So much so that even
the ethnic Manchu leaders of the Qing dynasty distanced themselves from their ethnic
identities so as to be more palatable leaders to the majority Han Chinese populations.
Institutionalized ethnic discrimination in China, backed by hundreds of years of historical
precedent, represented the class antagonisms that Maoist communism presented to China
as the common enemy of all Chinese minzu (ethnic groups). Thus, the CCP embraced a
strategy of ethnic unity -much akin to Titoism’s drive towards “brotherhood and unity”
amongst the south Slavs of Yugoslavia- and sought to replace ethnic loyalties with
“revolutionary comradeship.”64 After Mao’s death however, many of the party’s policies
that did emphasize unity of the different minzu were struck down and the CCP once
again refocused on the differences embodied within the population of China.
Where Mao sought to deemphasize the differences between the party’s faithful by
substituting ethnic identities with political ones, CCP leadership following his death took
a contradictory path towards the same end of making one unitary Chinese nation. This
new approach took much inspiration from the work of core GMD member Sun Yat-sen
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and underpinned many of the present-day policies which target Uyghurs in Xinjiang and
elsewhere across China. Sun theorized about the need for China to address the disunity of
its core minzu, Han Chinese, with “periphery minzu” like the Tibetans, Mongols and
ethnic Muslims like the Hui and Uyghur.65 The republican Chinese state that followed the
fall of the Qing recognized, after witnessing China rupture at its ethnic seams in 1911, the
importance of ethnic unity for preserving the ability of the Chinese State to govern
effectively. Sun captured the simultaneous senses of unity and disunity of China’s minzu
within his concept of Zhonghua Minzu, meaning Chinese nation. Sun notes:
“The essence of the state exists in its people. The uniting of the Han, Manchu,
Mongol, Hui and Tibetan territories into a single country also means the uniting
of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui, Tibetan and other lineages (zu) into a single
people (yiren). This you could say is minzu unity.”66
A crucial component of the brand of minzu unity sought by CCP leaders is, again, Han
chauvinism. As David Tobin notes, attempts to define “‘who is China’ … are all built on
underlying assumptions of Han superiority and that ethnic minority identities are a
problem to be solved.”67 This results in a simultaneous inclusive/exclusive effect where
minority identities are offered a path towards inclusion within the nation, but this path
necessitates the exclusion of their minority identity and its expulsion from their socially
intelligible self. As such, scholars have supposed that Han-ness operates as a nucleus of

James Leibold, “Positioning ‘Minzu’ Within Sun Yat-Sen’s Discourse of Minzuzhuyi,” Journal of
Asian History 38, no. 2 (2004): 164–65.
66 Leibold, 182.
67 Tobin, Securing China’s Northwest Frontier, 140.
65

36

Chinese society which all other identities move towards.68 The teleological dimension of
“being Chinese” is both justificatory for continued acceptance of Han chauvinism in
China and guiding for the policy goals of the current regime.
Soon after President Xi Jinping was first appointed to the office in 2013, he
spoke, echoing sentiment from past political leaders, of the imminent danger facing
China posed by the increasingly regular occurrences of violence within China’s western
regions. The 2009 riots in Xinjiang’s capital Ürümqi, which targeted Hans and Han
owned businesses, were fresh in the minds of Han Chinese across the nation and “had a
huge effect in generating a national discourse in China about ethnic policies.”69 Xi would
go on to highlight the importance of maintaining stability within these westernmost
regions of China as they constituted the means by which the nation would achieve the
“Chinese Dream.” The concept of the “Chinese Dream” animates much of CCP policy in
the present day and draws from a long history of “positioning China as a solitary actor in
a world of aggressors.”70 The dream, which seeks to “rejuvenate” the Chinese nation, is
defined by the two centenaries: “China becoming a “moderately well-off society” by
about 2020, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, and … China
becoming a fully developed nation by about 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People’s
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Republic.”71 The need for stability across all aspects of Chinese society is core to
achieving Xi’s dream, saying as much in a keynote address in April 2022 where he
reminded his constituents that “security is the precondition for development”. 72 Baked
into Xi’s dream is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which is his plan for reestablishing
China as a talisman of global economics by connecting China with Europe and Africa
through massive foreign investment in infrastructure. The original title “Silk Road
Economic Belt” (SREB) betrays the initiative’s interest in Xinjiang, being as the region
constitutes, and has constituted for decades, a buffer zone between China and the rest of
the western world. The existence of perceived and actual instability within Xinjiang
poses a threat to the establishment of the SREB, pitting the people of Xinjiang against the
ever precious “development” sought by the CCP.
Uyghur society in Xinjiang has thus become characterized as a roadblock to the
rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation by Xi’s Chinese Dream. Meanwhile, Xi himself
has become “the final arbiter of stability and unity in China” in a political environment
without opposition.73 Stability and security are chief concerns within the Xi regime and
as such the regime justifies policy against the backdrop of preserving the security of the
nation. Uyghurs become caught in this crossfire by a process that Tobin calls
securitization, wherein “the referent of security is the party-state’s identity narrative that
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frames alternative identity narratives as existential threats to Zhonghua Minzu.”74 The
result becomes positioning of non-Han identities as counter to both the present-day
security goals of the nation and the “progression” towards a unified Minzu, one still
characterized by a distinct Han-ness. Uyghur identities are forced into a dichotomy
opposite the economic development of wider China, achieved through security and
stability, which the people of China are forced to pick between by deciding either to
support CCP policy or face the consequences of going against Xi’s dream. The
Uyghur/security dichotomy also achieves the goal of linking present day Uyghurs with
the “savage barbarian hordes” of the western frontier that were pacified in the past by the
Chinese nation, further essentializing them as existential enemies to a thriving China.

Looking back for the sake of looking forward
Let us take an account of the existence of Uyghurs in China established thus far
so as to assess the applicability of the priming narrative framework. The Uyghurs are a
marginalized ethnic minority group within China whose existence is positioned socially
as antithetical to national progress and achievement of its destiny. They are the target of
policies proposed by the most powerful political figure in China since Mao which strip
them of their families, autonomy, reproductive capacity, and cultural identity. Joanne
Smith-Finley outlines the position between Scylla and Charybdis of Uyghur Muslims in
China deftly:
“On the one hand, the indigenous Turkic Muslim peoples are viewed as
“deviant” and disloyal subjects that must be “corrected” or else eradicated. On the
74
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other hand, Xinjiang the territory is viewed as an opportunity to secure a resourcerich settlement space for China’s Han majority, and as a gateway for China’s
intended economic expansion into the world. The Uyghurs currently stand in the
way of both goals. Viewed through this lens, the situation begins to resemble a
colonial genocide”75
Applying my framework, Xi Jinping achieves the cultivation of ethnic nationalism within
the Han ethnic majority through his “Chinese Dream” to reestablish the Chinese people at
the top of the global political hierarchy. This message has developed over recent years
into a pervasive emphasis on the security of the Chinese republic, as enshrined within
multiple speeches given by Xi including his most recent address referenced earlier. 76 The
Chinese people are, incidentally, understood within China to mean Han Chinese, or
Chinese of an ethnic minority who fashion themselves to be Han-like. Xi also achieves
the use of mythologizing rhetoric in the construction of the Han identity as well as the
other minority minzu as the notion of Zhonghua Minzu both creates a national ‘minzu’
and bakes into it the teleological pull on every minority minzu towards the Han nucleus.
By seeking to preserve their identity, Uyghurs are working against their destiny of
incorporation within Chinese-ness, constituted by their surrender of everything that
makes them not Han.
The last pattern included within my framework and exhibited within the Xinjiang
context is using the cultural memory of past instances of extreme violence (real or
manufactured) to substantiate the risk posed by a certain group to the whole. This pattern
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requires no help from me in showing itself to any observer of Chinese domestic politics.
In 2014, following years of sporadic inter-ethnic violence between Uyghurs and Han in
China, Xi Jinping declared the advent of the “People’s War on Terror.” With this,
following earlier American rhetoric of the Global War on Terror, Xi identified any
Uyghurs that opposed party policy alongside both the perpetrators of the anti-Han
violence as well as actual Islamic terrorist organizations operating elsewhere in the
world. Xi’s war on ‘terror’ served to further justify the vast networks of internment
camps where Uyghur ‘extremists’ are ‘de-radicalized.’77 Equivocating Uyghurs with
Islamic terrorism only serves to reinforce Zhonghua Minzu, which simultaneously
highlights their Uyghur-ness as difference and “hierarchically organizes difference
between superior, safe Han and inferior, dangerous minorities.”78 Modern day instances
of Uyghur violence committed explicitly against Han Chinese, like the 2009 attacks on
Han owned businesses in Ürümqi, are magnified by China’s history of internal strife
leading to cataclysmic political upheaval. Furthermore, Xinjiang has a track record of
rebellion and revolutionary tendencies throughout not just ancient history but even as
recently as the Eastern Turkistan separatist movements of the 1920s and the Kumul
Rebellion of the 1930s. The rift between Xinjiang and the rest of China proper is so
clearly understood in China that government policies have been implemented to educate
Uyghur youth from Xinjiang in large Universities in the east so that they might return to
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Xinjiang and help the assimilation of the region into China proper.79 The resultant
priming effect can already be seen in the widespread acceptance of the State’s treatment
of Uyghurs in and out of Xinjiang. Rather than wanting their literal eradication like the
Serbian Dream proposed, the Chinese dream necessitates the metaphysical eradication of
the Uyghurs. Rather than material destruction, Xi’s dream seeks the reconstruction of
Uyghur identities through the reeducation camps so as to make Uyghur-ness compatible
with a Zhonghua Minzu dominated by the Han mold. Unfortunately, this does not
likewise restrict the atrocities suffered by Uyghurs in Xinjiang to the metaphysical level.
Instead, they are forced to experience a real genocide, one backed by the hegemonic
majority minzu and inaccessible to the international bodies which have sought to root out
this phenomena from the modern world.
Detection of modern genocides like the Uyghur genocide requires incorporating
new theory and new information because of their emergent nature. Any current event is
detected within the current information environment, this is what my theory seeks to
acknowledge and achieve in the field of genocide studies. By theorizing an etiological
dimension of genocide through a case study of a historical instance of genocide and then
bringing that theory into the current information environment to analyze a modern
genocide, I hope to provide a framework through which one might evaluate current social
contexts for the potentiality of turning genocidal. In a sense, this framework looks back at

For an interesting investigation into the effects of this “Xinjiang Class” see Timothy Grose’s
Negotiating Inseparability, 2019
79

42

the development of a particular society’s identity narratives so that it may look forward
and forecast the potential of genocide when the markers that signal its’ potential are
observed. While too late to preempt the suffering of so many in China, my framework
might also aid in isolating social patterns worthy of problematizing so as to nip in the bud
any potentiality for the kind of suffering experienced by Uyghurs in Xinjiang or Bosnians
in Yugoslavia.
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Figure 1 Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1997 in Ramet, Balkan Babel, xxi.
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Figure 3 Population Growth Rates over time in Zenz, Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control, 8
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